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 Controversy over EU-wide biofuel policy resonated within the UK.
 At issue was how to stimulate future 2nd-generation biofuels.
 The government defended targets for 1st-generation as necessary to stimulate industry.
 Parliamentary Committees opposed biofuel targets as locking in 1st-generation.
 The UK government′s stance illustrates a ‘policy-promise lock-in’.
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a b s t r a c t
Controversy over EU-wide biofuel policy resonated within the UK, fuelling policy disagreements among
UK public authorities. They disagreed over how to protect a space for future second-generation biofuels,
which were expected to overcome harm from ﬁrst-generation biofuels. The UK government defended
rising targets for available biofuels as a necessary stimulus for industry to help fulﬁl the UK's EU
obligations and eventually develop second-generation biofuels. By contrast, Parliamentary Select
Committees opposed biofuel targets on grounds that these would instead lock-in ﬁrst-generation
biofuels, thus delaying or pre-empting second-generation biofuels. Those disagreements can be
explained by different institutional responsibilities and reputational stakes towards ‘promise-require-
ment cycles’, whereby techno-optimistic promises generate future requirements for the actors involved.
The UK government's stance illustrates a ‘policy-promise lock-in’, a dilemma whereby promised support
is a requirement for credibility towards technology innovators and thus technoscientiﬁc development –
but may delay the redirection of support from incumbent to preferable emerging technologies. Thus the
sociology of expectations – previously applied to technological expectations from technology innovators
– can be extended to analyse public authorities.
& 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
In 2003 the European Commission issued the ﬁrst EU Biofuels
Directive, initiating an EU-wide biofuel policy (EU, 2003). The
Directive set non-binding “reference” targets through 2010, requir-
ing increasing proportions of all diesel and petrol sold in Member
States to be biofuels. By 2003 biofuels were promoted as means to
mitigate climate change, enhance fuel security in road transport
and foster the rural economy. Abiding by its EU commitments, in
2005, the UK government announced the future implementation
of the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO), whose mandatory
targets started incentivising biofuel production from 2008 onwards.
Explicitly “cautious” in its support to available biofuels, the UK
government set RTFO targets lower than those demanded by the EU
and by the new-born UK biofuel industry.
During 2006–08 an international controversy erupted on whether
biofuel expansion would enhance environmental and socio-economic
sustainability, given biofuels′ dependence on unsustainable biomass
feedstock. Despite the controversy, the EU set a higher “binding” target
for “renewable” transport fuels by 2020 (EU, 2009red), amidst
expectations that these would be mainly biofuels in practice.
Facing tensions between its EU obligations, its dependence on
the biofuel industry and prominent critics of biofuel targets, the
UK government resisted calls for a policy moratorium by encoura-
ging three related expectations. First, future ‘advanced’ or ‘second-
generation’ biofuels would eventually use non-food biomass, thus
overcoming the environmental and socio-economic problems of
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currently available ‘conventional’ or ‘ﬁrst-generation’ biofuels.
Second, future sustainability standards would soon ensure and
certify biofuels' sustainability. Third, current biofuel targets would
stimulate UK industry to eventually develop second-generation
biofuels. The latter expectation was shared by the European
Commission and the biofuel industry but was strongly rejected
by two Select Committees of the UK Parliament – the Environ-
mental, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, and the Environmental
Audit Committee. Despite its previous commitments to the EU and
industry, the UK government eventually slowed down UK biofuel
targets in 2009, thus accommodating biofuel critics. The UK's
slow-down preﬁgured the European Commission's 2012 proposal
to limit the inclusion of ﬁrst-generation biofuels to half of the
2020's target (EC, 2012).
This paper looks at how the EU-wide biofuel controversy
resonated within the UK, especially through policy disagreements
among UK public authorities. The paper addresses the following
questions:
In shaping UK biofuel policy, what were the different accounts
and policy roles of expectations for future technology?
How do such expectations help to explain UK biofuel policy, its
tensions and shifts?
Uncontroversial per se, technological expectations were differ-
ently deployed for divergent stances towards UK biofuel policy. We
argue that these distinctive deployments relate to different insti-
tutional responsibilities towards ‘promise-requirement cycles’,
whereby techno-optimistic promises generate future require-
ments for the actors involved (van Lente, 2000). In particular,
the UK government's stance relates to a dilemma that we call a
‘policy-promise lock-in’, a concept which has broader relevance.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 introduces
analytical perspectives, especially the ‘sociology of expectations’
framework, reputational stakes of public authorities, and our
research methods. Sections 3–6 present the UK biofuel debate
among UK public authorities. Section 7 relates our ﬁndings to
previous literature. Section 8 interprets our ﬁndings as a ‘policy-
promise lock-in’.
2. Analytical perspectives and methods
To address the above questions, the paper elaborates concepts
from the sociology of expectations and from previous analyses of
UK biofuel policy, especially regarding reputational stakes, as
outlined in this section.
2.1. Technological expectations: promise-requirement cycles
The sociology of expectations has been applied mainly to
analyse expectations from technology innovators. Such factors
include scientists and industrialists, especially “innovation players
whose hopes and efforts are invested in the success of new
technologies” (Pollock and Williams, 2010: 2). With some adapta-
tions, the literature also offers insights for analysing how public
authorities strategically use technological expectations, as this
section explains.
As “real-time representations of future technological situations
and capabilities” (Borup et al., 2006: 286), technological expecta-
tions can be viewed as resources strategically “used to do things”
(van Lente, 1993: 185). More than simply cognitive, “expectations
can be understood as performative” (Borup et al., 2006: 286).
Performativity refers to expectations' power in fostering coopera-
tion and providing direction for decision-making, thus potentially
shaping or facilitating future technological developments (Borup
et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2003; van Lente, 1993; van Lente, 2000).
More than simply describing future realities, expectations
“guide activities, provide structure and legitimation, attract inter-
est and foster investment. They give deﬁnition of roles, clarify
duties, offer some shared shape of what to expect and how to
prepare for opportunities and risks” (Borup et al., 2006: 286). They
play a central role in mobilising resources at the macro level, “for
example in national policy through regulation and research
patronage” (Borup et al., 2006: 286). Related terms such as
technological “promises” and “visions” emphasise their enacting,
performative character: “expectations are wishful enactments of a
desired future” (Borup et al., 2006: 286), i.e. actions meant to
realise such a future.
When widely shared, expectations can become a “depersona-
lized social construction” not attributable to speciﬁc individuals or
groups of actors, and “part of a generalised and taken-for-granted
social repertoire” (Konrad, 2006: 431). For instance, “technologies
presented as the next generation… are self-justifying because the
notion of next generation is widely accepted” (van Lente and Rip,
1998: 222–223). Whenever they become societal assumptions or
‘collective’, such expectations can even guide or justify the actions
of those who do not necessarily share them. Expectations always
depend on a “process of continuous exchange of expectations”,
where “individual or collective actors inﬂuence collective expecta-
tions, [and]… are themselves subject to the inﬂuence of collective
expectations” (Konrad, 2006: 431–432).
Expectations contain descriptions of future roles “for the self,
others and artefacts” (van Lente, 1993: 195). Expectations entail a
promise to fulﬁl those roles. Seen as promises on future commit-
ments, shared expectations can turn into requirements for the
actors enunciating or endorsing them, and so generate ‘promise-
requirement cycles’ (van Lente, 1993: 191–193). “Behind the
promise-requirement cycles lies the dynamic of expectations: as
soon as expectations are shared, they assume a life of their own…
they create a pattern into which the actors themselves may be
locked” (van Lente and Rip, 1998: 217). Technology innovators
become required to demonstrate progress towards fulﬁlling their
techno-promises, while other actors who endorse them become
required to provide support.
Besides providing political-ﬁnancial support to technological
innovators, “governments” and “others” play an essential role in
converting promises into requirements. Such conversion crucially
depends on their assessments, endorsement and support of
technologists′ promises (van Lente, 1993: 167; van Lente, 2000:
60; van Lente and Rip, 1998: 216). Thus governments and others
mainly act as selectors of technological expectations, by contrast to
technologists formulating and promoting techno-promises on
their own behalf. Other actors can also represent and defend
rhetorically the support given to technologists (van Lente, 1993:
160; van Lente, 2000: 54). Such spokespersons might be actors in
universities, industries and even “within the government, which
becomes more and more involved in technological developments”
(van Lente, 1993: 160).
In such ways, expectations potentially legitimise actions, com-
municate intentions, attract other actors and protect a space for
innovations (Geels and Smit, 2000: 882; van Lente, 1993: 185, 196).
Aware of such power, actors strategically use expectations to
inﬂuence other actors' views on technological futures in order to
favour their own interests. Promises and diffuse scenarios are used
to convince funding organisations to invest money and attract
other practitioners to join the development (Geels and Smit, 2000:
881). Technology innovators may exaggerate their promises:
“…in order to attract attention from (ﬁnancial) sponsors, to
stimulate agenda-setting processes (both technical and politi-
cal) and to build ‘protected spaces’… This performative dimen-
sion of future images provides a complementary interpretation
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of the failure of some future speculations” (Geels and Smit,
2000: 881).
Especially in early stages of technological development, inﬂated
prospects may lead to disappointment when earlier statements
fail to match actual outcomes (Borup et al., 2006: 289). Those gaps
can undermine the reputations of both individuals and entire
innovation ﬁelds (Brown, 2003: 6; Brown et al., 2003: 1). Such
“expectations and the frequent disappointments to which they
lead are accompanied by serious costs in terms of reputations,
misallocated resources and investment” (Borup et al., 2006: 290).
Drawing on the above insights about shared expectations and
consequent requirements, this paper investigates how public
authorities deployed technology and policy expectations in the
UK biofuel controversy. We distinguish analytically between
techno-promises and ‘policy-promises’, i.e. the promises made
by public authorities for their future support after endorsing
technological expectations from technology innovators.
2.2. UK biofuel policy: government’s reputational stakes
Several scholars have looked at UK biofuel policy from various
perspectives and pursuing different research questions. This sec-
tion highlights previous analyses which closely relate to ours.
Two studies focused on UK stakeholder interactions, especially
in the period after NGOs turned against biofuel targets in 2006–07.
Despite that shift, “RTFO carbon and sustainability policy has
latterly reﬂected the interests of DfT [Department for Transport]
and organisations with an interest in motor vehicle-based mobi-
lity, interests that biofuels readily mesh with” (Upham et al., 2011:
2673). According to another study, NGOs' post-2007 opposition to
biofuels was one driver prompting the UK government's decisions
to launch the Gallagher Review in 2008 [ofﬁcial enquiry on
biofuels] and eventually to slow-down UK biofuel targets in
2009 (Pilgrim and Harvey, 2010: 4.17–4.18). We interpret these
decisions as government efforts to preserve its credibility and
legitimacy vis-à-vis biofuel critics and innovators, while justifying
current support as a requirement for future biofuel development.
Palmer analysed the RTFO′s development from a “discursive-
institutionalist perspective”. To explain the discursive proximity
between the UK government and biofuel industry just before the
Gallagher Review, Palmer argued that biofuel advocates “success-
fully transplanted their ecomodernist discourse into policy makers
′ consciousness and vocabularies”, because of its “superior appeal”
compared to that of biofuel critics. Besides, the biofuel industry
and the policy-making community had become economically
interdependent, as “the former depended upon signiﬁcant public
sector investment and the latter viewed the development of
‘advanced’ biofuels as critical to Britain's future economic compe-
titiveness” (Palmer, 2010: 1002–1005). Although a partial cogni-
tive convergence between the UK government and biofuel
industry may explain their discoursive proximity, this happened
while the UK government was promising lower support to ﬁrst-
generation biofuels than that demanded by the EU's targets and
biofuels industry.
Analysing UK biofuel policy as policy appraisal, Dunlop inves-
tigated temporal tensions between policy and knowledge devel-
opment. Despite acknowledging harmful impacts, the UK
government only slowed down its biofuel targets, while rejecting
calls for a policy moratorium. Dunlop infers broader considera-
tions by the DfT, especially “sunk costs, in both economic and
reputational terms”. Industry had invested on the assumption that
biofuel targets would rise, so “any radical re-thinking of policy
would not only have been legally and economically questionable
but would also have fatally undermined the DfT's credibility in the
fuel sector” (Dunlop, 2010: 354). Building on Dunlop's inference,
we explain UK biofuel policy as maintaining policy-promises on
incumbent biofuels, understood as necessary for technoscientiﬁc
advance towards emerging biofuels.
Boucher investigated interactions between the UK biofuel
controversy and regulatory development. Between 2007–11, “…a
potentially important shift is observed in regulatory discourse. Just
as the framing of the technology in the controversy was increas-
ingly reduced to GHG [greenhouse-gas] emissions with peripheral
reference to social and environmental sustainability, government
documents also increasingly eschewed reference to improving
energy security and rural economies” (Boucher, 2012: 152). Obser-
ving a similar trend in policy discourse, we link this with
technological expectations for advanced biofuels.
Extending previous analyses of UK biofuel policy, we explain
decade-long changes through a distinctive perspective on techno-
logical expectations. We emphasise the UK government's cautious
approach in promising lower support to ﬁrst-generation biofuels,
relative to the EU targets and industry demands. We also show
how the UK government's ‘reputational sunk costs' were linked to
the argument justifying biofuel targets for ﬁrst-generation biofuels
as necessary for technoscientiﬁc advance in second-generation
biofuels. As an implicit rationale behind reputational sunk costs:
Public authorities must fulﬁl their previous policy-promises as a
requirement to preserve their technology policy effectiveness in
mobilising prospective investors in the future. The linkage with
technoscientiﬁc advance can be better explained through promise-
requirement cycles, i.e. maintaining current targets for ﬁrst-
generation biofuels as means to engage prospective innovators in
a promise-requirement cycle on second-generation biofuels.
2.3. Materials and methods
This paper analyses ofﬁcial documents issued during 2000–
2012 by several UK and EU public authorities in their own name
(see Fig. 1). In reconstructing their chronological sequence, we
traced backwards the references in the ofﬁcial documents and
websites of the UK Government Departments involved in biofuel
policy. Their ofﬁcial documents were issued in the name of the UK
government. Complementing those documents are ofﬁcial docu-
ments from the European Commission and Council and the
Gallagher Review from the DfT's Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA).
A special focus is the ofﬁcial correspondence of the Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRAC) and the Environ-
mental Audit Committee (EAC). Both criticised the UK government's
biofuel policymaking during 2003–2008. Parliamentary Select
Committees scrutinise UK government' policies and publish ofﬁcial
reports to which the UK government should reply within two
months (HoC_IO, 2009: 5).
In analysing all documents, we looked for expectations of
second-generation biofuels. We also looked for convergent, diver-
gent and shifting expectations on whether support for ﬁrst-
generation biofuels would be a requirement for industry to
develop second-generation biofuels, or else a barrier to their
development. Once identiﬁed, such technological expectations
were used to compare the speciﬁc biofuel visions among public
authorities.
3. Policy engagement: a low starting point
Until 2002 UK public authorities and industry shared collective
expectations for hydrogen as the “fuel of the future” (DETR, 2000:
29; EAC, 2001: Paragraph 86; RCEP, 1997: 34–35), while biofuels
were marginal in government research initiatives and ﬁnancial
support for alternative fuels (DETR, 2000: 29; DTI, 2001; 2002: 23;
EST, 2002: 11; HoC_IO, 2002: 57). Biofuels were dismissed as
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unsuitable for the UK for various reasons. Experts had voiced
concerns about overall GHG savings and adverse environmental
effects from feedstock cultivation for biofuels (RCEP, 1994: 142).
Within the Department for the Environment, Transport and the
Regions (DETR),2 the Alternative Fuels Group had raised doubts
about biofuels′ beneﬁts for carbon abatement and fuel security
(DETR, 2000: 29).
In July 2002 the UK government introduced the ﬁrst ﬁnancial
incentive: a fuel duty discount only for biodiesel (20p per litre).
Previous proposals from Liberal Democrats to further increase
support and extend it to bioethanol were dismissed as ‘premature’
by the UK government, which raised doubts about their economic,
practical and environmental beneﬁts (HoC_IO, 2002: 23).
Meanwhile, in November 2001 the European Commission had
started formal negotiations on an EU Directive on Biofuels (EC,
2001), which became law in May 2003 (EU, 2003). The Directive
set non-binding “reference” targets requiring an increasing pro-
portion of all diesel and petrol sold in the Member States to be
biofuels, precisely: 2% by 2005 and 5.75% by 2010 per energy
content. Member States had the option to set their own “indica-
tive” targets and choose how to implement them, but were
required to justify any divergence from the EU-wide reference
targets and report on progress towards the targets chosen.
By 2003 various public authorities were promoting biofuels
through optimistic expectations for future beneﬁts in mitigating
climate change and enhancing fuel security in road transport,
i.e. in reducing GHG emissions and diversifying transport fuel
supplies, as well as in fostering the rural economy, i.e. in creating
new markets for non-food crops and jobs in the biofuel supply-
chain (EC, 2001: 31–32; EFRAC, 2003: 5; : 42–44).
Three months before the 2003 EU Directive, the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI)3 published an Energy White Paper. While
still preferring hydrogen, the UK government now promoted
biofuels as an “important potential route for achieving the goal
of zero-carbon transport, creating new opportunities for agricul-
ture in the UK as well as globally” (DTI, 2003: 69). However,
uncertainties and disagreements persisted, especially about how
to ensure the sustainability of biofuels.
In 2003 Parliament's Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Committee (EFRAC) sent a report to the Department of Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA),4 questioning how UK
biofuel policy could contribute to DEFRA's policy objectives.
Supporting biofuels, the EFRAC welcomed the policy change: the
UK had to signiﬁcantly reduce its GHG emissions, and biofuels
were an “attractive means of doing so for transport”, at least “until
hydrogen fuel cells become commercially viable” (EFRAC, 2003: 11).
The EFRAC lamented that the UK government appeared as “still
testing the waters” for developing a domestic biofuel industry, with
its weak support reﬂecting its “ambivalent attitude” (EFRAC, 2003:
18). However, the EFRAC also acknowledged the lack of clear
evidence on both future beneﬁts for the rural economy and
environmental impacts of expanding biofuel production in the UK
and elsewhere. On these grounds, it recommended the development
of an auditing system on biofuels' environmental and socio-
economic impacts in producer countries (EFRAC, 2003: 12, 18).
UK Parliament
House of Commons
Select Committees
UK Government
Environmental Audit
Committee (EAC) 
Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs Committee (EFRAC) Department of Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) 
House of Lords
European Union
Department for Transport (DfT)
Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA)
EU 
Commission
Treasury
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC)
EU Council EU Parliament
Fig. 1. Public authorities map.
2 Between 2001 and 02 the Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions (DETR) was reformed in Department for Transport, Local Government and
the Regions (DTLR). The responsibilities for environmental and rural policies were
transferred to the newly formed Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (Defra). Established in 2002, Defra has been responsible for the environ-
mental, agricultural and rural aspects of the UK biofuel policy since then. In 2002
the DTLR was reformed again in Department for Transport (DfT), with its remit
narrowed to transport polices. The DfT has been in charge of the practical
implementation of all ﬁnancial incentives for biofuels since then. The HM Customs
and Excise Department – which after the merger with Inland Revenue in 2005
became the current HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) – has collaborated with the
DfT in implementing both ﬁnancial supporting schemes. Meanwhile, the Treasury
has been responsible for the ﬁscal side of ﬁnancial incentives since their inceptions
(EFRAC, 2004-01-27; 1, 17)
3 The DTI led on energy policy at the time. In 2007 the DTI was reformed in the
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). A year later, it
handed over energy policy to the newly formed Department of Energy and Climate
Change (DECC), which has led on energy policy since then. These Departments
have dealt with the energy policy aspects of biofuel policy
4 EFRAC's remit is “to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy” of
DEFRA “and its associated bodies” (EFRAC, 2003). Established in 2002, the DEFRA
had become responsible for the environmental-agricultural issues of the newly
emerging UK biofuel policy (EFRAC, 2003: 17)
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In reply to EFRAC, the UK government did not intend to
establish industries mostly importing biofuels (EFRAC, 2004gr: 8)
and/or “based on excessive… subsidy not justiﬁed by clear and
well-established evidence of environmental, social and economic
beneﬁts… for both the tax-payer and the economy as a whole”
(EFRAC, 2004gr: 6). Furthermore, the current duty discount for
biodiesel was introduced only in July 2002, and the duty discount
for bioethanol was going to be introduced only in January 2005, so
it was “too early to judge how far the policy has been a success”
(EFRAC, 2004gr: 8). The UK government also doubted the practical
feasibility of an auditing system: “auditing the environmental
impact of biofuels in the countries in which they are produced is
extremely problematic and it is unlikely that a cost-effective
and robust system of regulation could be introduced” (EFRAC,
2004gr: 9).
In the 2004 report on progress to the European Commission,
the UK government announced only a 0.3% per volume target for
2005, much lower than the EU's 2% per energy content.5 As
justiﬁcations for the lower target, ﬁnancial “incentives have only
been recently introduced”, and from the “UK's low starting point”
(HM Govt, 2004: 8). In that report, it also raised doubts about the
economic, fuel security and environmental beneﬁts of higher
support to biofuels:
“Industry has called for a higher level of incentive, but the cost
of the current incentive already outweighs the monetised
carbon beneﬁt, and biofuels are currently an expensive method
of carbon abatement… Our economic analysis suggests that
greater incentive levels at this time would largely result in
imports, including from outside the EU. This would limit the
potential beneﬁts to the UK and broader EU agricultural & rural
sectors of a new market. In addition, there is strong concern
that greater demand from the EU for biofuel feedstocks could
lead to further deforestation in South East Asia and South
America – thereby undermining the environmental beneﬁt
sought through the measure” (HM Govt, 2004: 2).
Accommodating the EU Directive, in November 2005 the UK
government eventually promised higher support to available
biofuels by announcing the future implementation of the Renew-
able Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). From April 2008 the RTFO
would set a legal obligation on large transport fuel suppliers to
blend increasing annual rates of biofuels in the road-transport
fuels they supplied to the UK (HM Govt, 2005: 3). Announced to
rise only to 5% per volume by 2010/11, RTFO's mandatory targets
were still more cautious than the EU's higher reference target of
5.75% per energy content6 by 2010.
Overcoming its previous objections, the UK government also
announced the future implementation of an “assurance scheme
alongside the Obligation to ensure, as far as possible, biofuels are
produced from sustainable sources” (HM Govt, 2006: Section 1).
However, controversy soon deepened over how and when to
evaluate the sustainability of biomass sources for biofuels.
4. Policy implementation: sustainability issues
By 2006–2007 ﬁrst-generation biofuels were widely recognised
as environmentally and socio-economically problematic (Boucher,
2012: 150; Dunlop, 2010: 352; Palmer, 2010: 999). To justify
current targets, the future development of effective sustainability
standards and second-generation biofuels had become crucial.
Yet great uncertainty persisted about when these developments
would materialise. UK biofuel policy faced a dilemma: whether the
UK's mandatory targets should await the development of sustain-
ability standards and more sustainable biofuels, or else be main-
tained as a means to stimulate these developments.
By 2006 the EFRAC had reversed its earlier vision on current
biofuels, which do “not present the most effective or efﬁcient way
of making a signiﬁcant difference to the UK's carbon emissions in
the long term” (EFRAC, 2006: 5). It further criticised the UK
government for a “disproportionate degree” of support for trans-
port biofuels, to the detriment of other bioenergy forms, which
offered greater carbon savings (EFRAC, 2006: 3). It recommended
that any biomass use for energy should be evaluated for impacts
on land use, including food security (EFRAC, 2006: 32–35).
The EFRAC was also “extremely disappointed” by the
announcement that biofuel auditing would not be enforced in
the initial phase of the RTFO. Without sustainability standards, the
RTFO would effectively favour ﬁrst-generation biofuels – readily
available and cheaper to buy, over second-generation biofuels –
offering greater GHG savings. Thus it warned that biofuel support
as currently set “could ‘lock in’ ﬁrst-generation biofuel technolo-
gies and so damage the prospects for development and use of
more advanced fuels” (EFRAC, 2006: 45–46). Second-generation
biofuels would need “concerted and sustained investment” in
order to become commercially viable, partly by adapting the RTFO
to reward biofuels according to their speciﬁc GHG abatement
(EFRAC, 2006: 3). Thus at issue was how to protect a space for
development of environmentally more sustainable biofuels.
The UK government raised practical difﬁculties about those
proposals. Although “integrating GHG fully into the RTFO was
fundamental to… achieve its objectives,… the additional complex-
ity, legal uncertainty and short term implications of incentivising
GHG savings directly suggested that a staged approach toward
integration was advisable” (EFRAC, 2006gr: 10–11). The UK gov-
ernment was “keen to move toward direct incentivisation as soon
as it becomes feasible to do so” (EFRAC, 2006gr: 10–11) and
reafﬁrmed its commitment to encourage the development of
biofuels offering greater GHG savings (EFRAC, 2006gr: 5–6).
Despite the controversy, in March 2007 the European Council
agreed to a further biofuel target of 10% per energy content7 by
2020. Although the new target was higher and mandatory, it set a
slower increase in annual rates than the 2003 Directive had done.
Also the 10% target was subject to pre-conditions, especially the
sustainability of eligible biofuels and the availability of second-
generation biofuels (EU Council, 2007: 21).
On that basis, in May 2007 the UK government reconﬁrmed the
pre-condition of “second-generation biofuels becoming commer-
cially available” for the new target (DEFRA et al., 2007: 8), and of
sustainability standards being enforced for any RTFO levels above
5% per volume after 2011 (DEFRA, 2007: 33). The UK government
promoted ﬁrst-generation biofuels as the only available option to
fulﬁl EU obligations, while acknowledging that transport biofuels
were the least cost-effective biomass conversion for reducing GHG
emissions. Biomass conversion priorities need not reﬂect that
hierarchy because “it does not take into account the relative
importance of biomass fuel sources in delivering climate change
goals and targets”, especially “in the transport sector for which
there are few other options in the short to medium term” (DEFRA,
2007: 7).
The UK government then reinforced expectations for future
improvements in environmental and socio-economic sustainabil-
ity: “It is likely that by 2020 second-generation biofuel technolo-
gies will be in place. This should make the production of biofuels
5 2% per energy content is equivalent to 2,5% per volume (RFA, 2008: 90)
6 5.75% per energy content is equivalent to around 7% per volume (RFA,2008: 90) 7 10% per energy content is equivalent to 12.4% per volume (RFA, 2008: 90)
P. Berti, L. Levidow / Energy Policy 66 (2014) 135–143 139
from land much more efﬁcient, with a reduced area needed to
produce a given volume of biofuels…” (DEFRA, 2007: 22).
In June 2007 the UK government reconﬁrmed its intention to
postpone the introduction of a mandatory system of sustainability
standards until after the RTFO's launch in April 2008. However, it
also announced that biofuels would be rewarded according to
their GHG savings from April 2010, and become eligible for
support only if their feedstocks were certiﬁed as sustainable from
April 2011 (HM Govt, 2008: Section 2).
Thus expectations for future improved sustainability served to
justify rising future targets, especially in response to biofuel critics.
Meanwhile the pre-conditions on the availability of second-
generation biofuels and sustainability standards sent the biofuel
industry a signal to develop the former and implement the latter.
In these ways, the EU Council and UK government sought to ﬁnd a
future way out of their policy commitments to ﬁrst-generation
biofuels.
In its 2008 proposal for a Renewable Energy Directive, however,
the European Commission did not include the EU Council's pre-
condition on the availability of second-generation biofuels for the
2020 target. It justiﬁed the exclusion on the following grounds:
“The main purpose of binding targets is to provide certainty for
investors. Deferring a decision about whether a target is binding
until a future event takes place is thus not appropriate” (EC, 2008:
13). Such pre-condition similarly conﬂicted with industry's
demands for higher future targets as prior incentives for technos-
cientiﬁc advance, especially for second-generation biofuels (EAC,
2008: Evidence 195).
5. Policy conﬂicts: debating routes toward second-generation
biofuels
By 2008 the UK government was already justifying biofuel
policy through three optimistic expectations: second-generation
biofuels would soon overcome ﬁrst-generation biofuels′ problems;
sustainability standards would soon be effective and implemen-
ted; and current ﬁrst-generation targets would stimulate industry
to fulﬁl the previous two expectations. The latter expectation was
questioned by the Environmental Audit Committee (EAC).8
When the ‘food versus fuel’ controversy gained prominence in
2007–08, ﬁrst-generation biofuels faced greater criticism regard-
ing their GHG savings and wider drawbacks. Joining those criti-
cisms and reiterating the EFRAC 2006 report, the EAC 2008 report
advocated priority for the development of sustainability standards
and second-generation biofuels. The EAC argued that “biofuels can
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from road transport” and that
second-generation biofuel technologies “might have a sustainable
role in the future” (EAC, 2008: 3). However, it doubted that current
sustainability standards could prevent all damage from ﬁrst-
generation biofuels and so proposed a moratorium on current
biofuel targets. Current sustainability standards were ineffective
because they omitted wider impacts, such as fertiliser and pesticide
pollution, the destruction of carbon sinks internationally and worsen-
ing food security in developing countries (EAC, 2008: 14, 19, 22).
As grounds for a moratorium, this would delay biofuel expan-
sion “until technology improves, robust mechanisms to prevent
damaging land use change are developed, and international
sustainability standards are agreed” (EAC, 2008: 3, 14). It strongly
criticised the RTFO: “In the absence of such standards, the
Government and EU have moved too quickly to stimulate the
use of biofuels” (EAC, 2008: 14). Finally, it warned that “it will take
considerable courage for the Government and EU to admit that the
current policy arrangements for biofuels are inappropriate” (EAC,
2008: 3). As the term ‘courage’ implied, a policy retreat on higher
targets could undermine the EU's and UK government's credibility
vis-à-vis biofuel suppliers, unlike the EAC, which had no respon-
sibility towards them.
Responding to the EAC, the UK government rejected the
moratorium proposal on several grounds. It would “mean missing
an opportunity to make carbon savings” in a context of current
targets already set at “cautious” levels. It would also mean
“reneging on earlier commitments”, upon which biofuel producers
and fuel suppliers had already made investment decisions (EAC,
2008gr: 7). Moreover, it was not “feasible to wait for technological
improvements before utilising biofuels” (EAC, 2008gr: 10–11).
Rather, “It is by encouraging the ﬁrst generation of biofuels that
we can expect to move towards second-generation technology”
(EAC, 2008gr: 14).
In other words, breaking previous policy-promises to support
biofuels would have discouraged investment into biofuel technos-
cientiﬁc advance. Locked into such policy-promises, the UK govern-
ment argued that maintaining the current biofuel market was a
requirement for the industry to “have any incentive to make
technological developments leading to cheaper biofuels with better
greenhouse gas savings” (EAC, 2008gr: 11–12). At the same time, it
assured biofuel critics that it “will not support any increase beyond
current targets without being satisﬁed that the conditions set by the
March 2007 European Council are met” (EAC, 2008gr: 8).
In its counter-response, the EAC “urged the Government to
resist attempts to increase EU biofuel targets” and contested all its
arguments against a moratorium (EAC, 2008gr: 5). In particular,
the EAC acknowledged “the concern for those that might have
already invested in biofuels”, but also contended that such “con-
cern is outweighed by concerns about the potential harm that
could arise if the development of biofuel continues without the
necessary safeguards” (EAC, 2008gr: 4). Furthermore, “It will be
much harder to take decisions about biofuels once an industry has
fully established itself on a basis that may not be fully sustainable”
(EAC, 2008gr: 4). Then citing the Royal Society, the EAC reiterated
that current policy was “inadequate” as will direct investment into
“more established near-term options… and little to the more
promising long-term options” (as reported in EAC, 2008gr: 4),
i.e. into ﬁrst-generation at the expense of second-generation
biofuels.
6. Policy slow-down: lower targets and delayed
techno-expectations
Prompted by those disagreements and the wider public con-
troversy (Palmer, 2010: 993, 1003–1004; Pilgrim and Harvey, 2010:
4.17–4.18), the UK government commissioned the DfT′s Renewable
Fuels Agency (RFA)9 to carry out an expert review of biofuel policy.
Known as the Gallagher Review, the study reconﬁrmed the UK
government's rationale that a moratorium would “reduce the
ability of the biofuel industry to invest in new technologies or
transform the sourcing of its feedstock to the more sustainable
supplies necessary to create a truly sustainable industry”10 (RFA,
8 EAC's remit is “to consider to what extent the policies and programmes of all
government departments and non-departmental public bodies contribute to
environmental protection and sustainable development” (EAC, 2008)
9 The DfT created the Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA) in 2007 and delegated to
it the administration of the RTFO. In 2011, the RFA ceased to exist and the DfT
retook direct control of the RTFO
10 As Dunlop pointed out: “Of course, the fact that the body conducting the
review—the RFA—had been created to implement the RTFO made it unlikely that
such drastic action [a policy moratorium] would be recommended” (Dunlop,
2010: 353)
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2008: 66). Regarding the future availability of advanced biofuels,
“a market share of 1–2% by energy of transport fuels by 2020
seems feasible” (RFA, 2008: 13, 44), likewise reinforcing techno-
optimistic expectations.
However, the Gallagher Review also acknowledged the con-
troversial drawbacks of available biofuels. An uncontrolled large-
scale application could lead to direct and indirect land-use-
changes, which would eventually result in net increases in
greenhouse-gasses as well as unsustainable impacts on developing
countries' local environment and socio-economic conditions.
In particular, the displacement of existing agricultural land, due
to biofuel demand, would lead to carbon sink destructions (e.g.
deforestation), biodiversity losses, human rights′ abuses and food
insecurity in developing countries (RFA, 2008: 8, 18-19). On those
grounds, it then advised the UK government to slow down the
biofuel targets “until adequate controls to address [land] displace-
ment effects are implemented and are demonstrated to be
effective” (RFA, 2008: 8).
During 2007–2009 the UK government also accommodated
critics, industry, and the EU by increasing R&D funds for second-
generation biofuels. Such funds have been allocated through
Research Councils, mainly the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (EPSRC) and the Biotechnology and Biological
Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), whose budgets have increased
greatly since 2007 (UKERC, 2009). As part of its wider programme
on ‘Sustainable Power Generation and Supply’ (Supergen), the
EPSRC set up the Supergen Biomass and Bioenergy Consortium,
researching also advanced biofuels; its total budget increased from
d2.9 m during 2003–07 to d6.4 m during 2007–11. As its main
conduit for bioenergy R&D funds, the BBSRC set up the Sustainable
Bioenergy Centre (BSBEC) in 2009; with an initial funding of
d27 m. The BSBEC was promoted as a “key contribution which
will target research on the development of advanced bioenergy
and biofuels” (DECC, 2009: 148), and “support the build-up of
research capacity into how bioenergy can help replace fossil fuels
with renewable, low-carbon alternatives” (DEFRA, 2007: 35). As a
rationale for such R&D priorities, second-generation biofuels
would use natural resources more efﬁciently and sustainably, i.e.
by minimising land requirements and avoiding food crops.
By endorsing the Gallagher Review and expanding R&D funds
for second-generation biofuels, the UK government sought to
enhance the credibility of its policy rationale and expectations.
Then, in its report on progress to the European Commission, it
argued that “a more cautious approach to biofuel production is
necessary” (HM Govt, 2008: Section 2). Accordingly, it announced
the phasing out of biofuel duty discounts by March 2010,11 and in
April 2009 slowed down the RTFO's annual rates to reach 5%12 per
volume only in 2013/2014. Although reduced, RTFO's biofuels
targets, combined with the higher EU target, “should still give
incentive to the biofuels industry to invest in new technology and
domestic capacity” (HM Govt, 2009: Section 1).
Meanwhile, the European Commission issued the Renewable
Energy and Fuel Quality Directives13 (EU, 2009fq, 2009red),
reconﬁrming the 10% per energy content target,14 but omitting
any pre-condition on the availability of second-generation biofuel
by 2020, despite the EU Council's 2007 proposal. Such a pre-
condition also disappeared from UK policy documents.
Since then, technoscientiﬁc advance towards second-
generation biofuels disappointed earlier expectations. Neverthe-
less, the UK government and European Commission have still
promoted such expectations to justify their biofuel targets. Mean-
while the controversy has narrowed around GHG emissions from
indirect land-use-changes, somewhat losing its initial prominence
(Boucher, 2012: 151–152).
In the 2012 UK Bioenergy Strategy, the UK government stated:
“It is important that future policies and incentives are aligned to
incentivise low risk areas that minimise technology and invest-
ment lock in to pathways that may become undesirable and
minimise lock out of potential vital pathways” (DfT, 2012: 57).
Although “low-risk areas” included second-generation biofuels,
earlier technological expectations for them were slowed down:
“Advanced biofuels could start playing an increasing role in
reducing road transport emissions in the 2020 s” (DfT, 2012: 52).
Still, “So long as the sustainability can be assured… some conven-
tional biofuels can offer a cost effective contribution to reducing
carbon emissions from road transport” (DfT, 2012: 41). Meanwhile
civil servants were considering the earlier warnings from EFRAC:
Policy may lock in particular pathways, e.g. through investment
decisions and several thousand jobs, so that government would
face political difﬁculties in shifting its support to a different
pathway later. Already the biofuel mandate may be locking in
current biofuels. The UK government remains silent about any
increase in the blending quota above 5% after the EU review due in
2014 (civil servant, interview, 22.05.12).
In 2012 the European Commission proposed amendments to
the 2009 EU Directives, somewhat reversing its previous stance.
While reconﬁrming the 10% target, it proposed to cap the con-
tribution of ﬁrst-generation biofuels from ‘food crops′ to 5% per
energy content15 through 2020, to encourage “the transition
towards advanced biofuels”. 16 It also proposed better sustain-
ability reporting by including indirect land-use-changes. Although
those proposals resemble an ultimatum to ﬁrst-generation biofuel
suppliers, the European Commission “also aims at protecting
existing investments until 2020” (EC, 2012: 3, 8, 14).
7. Discussion: tensions among UK public authorities
From a low starting point, the UK government was obliged by
the 2003 9 EU DDirective to promise higher support to biofuels.
Yet it announced signiﬁcantly lower biofuel targets than those in
the Directive. By 2008 UK targets were explicitly defended as
‘cautious′ in response to high-proﬁle calls for a moratorium, and
were eventually delayed in 2009. This caution relates to the risk
of locking in a nascent industry for ﬁrst-generation biofuels,
which the UK government initially presented as environmentally
and socio-economically risky and excessively expensive (EFRAC,
2004gr: 6; HM Govt, 2004: 2).
The UK government became constrained in multiple ways: by
its EU obligations, by its dependence on a new-born UK biofuel
industry necessary for fulﬁlling them, and by its need to establish
11 As exception, the duty incentive for biodiesel from used cooking oil was later
announced to remain in place until 31 March 2012.
12 Against the 10% per energy content by 2020 – equivalent to 12.4% per
volume (RFA, 2008: 90).
13 The 2009 Renewable Energy Directive and Fuel Quality Directive repealed
the 2003′s EU Biofuels Directive.
14 Now referred to any ‘renewable′ fuels, amidst expectations that these would
be mainly biofuels in practice.
15 Equivalent to the estimated consumption level at the end of 2011 per energy
content (EC, 2012: 14)
16 In the orientation debate on the EC′s proposal, the UK delegation lamented
that: “As currently drafted the proposed Directive neither adequately addresses
Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC) emissions nor adequately encourages the transi-
tion to advanced biofuels” (underlined text in the original document). According to
the UK delegation, the deﬁnitions of the biofuel feedstocks to include in the cap in
support are incomplete, warranting the application of an ‘iLUC factor′ to make sure
that all biofuels with excessive iLUC are included. Another concern was the design
of EU biofuel targets. The UK delegation argued that, as currently designed. EU
biofuel targets do not provide a real incentive to develop advanced biofuels (EU
Council, 2013).
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credible incentives for its technology policy. Since then the UK
government started acting not only as selector, but also as
promoter of technological expectations (as observed in other
technological contexts by van Lente, 1993: 160), though the latter
role aimed primarily to maintain legitimacy towards technology
innovators and Parliamentary critics. In doing so, the UK govern-
ment deferred to industry′s technological expectations: especially
that second-generation biofuels could start replacing current ones
before the 2020 deadline for EU targets. This “discourse trans-
plantation” has been partially explained in cognitive terms – as
resulting from the “superior appeal” of the biofuel industry′s
arguments (Palmer, 2010: 1002, 1005). But the UK government
was promising a lower support to ﬁrst-generation biofuels than
that demanded by the EU and biofuel industry, partly as means to
ensure the fulﬁlment of expectations for second-generation
biofuels.
During the 2006–2008 controversy on ﬁrst-generation biofuels
as unsustainable, the discursive space narrowed on GHG savings,
while marginalising fuel security and rural economy as policy
drivers (Boucher, 2012: 152). Considered as mature technologies,
incumbent ﬁrst-generation biofuels had become controversial
regarding their unsustainable biomass inputs. Meanwhile
second-generation biofuels depended on emerging technologies
gaining ‘collective expectations′ (Konrad, 2006: 431), or at least
widespread public endorsement among public authorities, as
means to avoid negative effects of ﬁrst-generation biofuels.
Facing the controversy, the UK government presented second-
generation biofuels as if they were ‘self-justifying’ through an
appeal to technological progress (as observed in other technolo-
gical contexts by van Lente and Rip, 1998: 222–223), which would
provide greater environmental and socio-economic beneﬁts. The
UK government linked optimistic expectations for future sustain-
ability standards, future second-generation biofuels and their
dependence on current targets for ﬁrst-generation biofuels.
The latter expectation failed to convince Parliamentary Select
Committees. They argued that the UK government should with-
draw support from available ﬁrst-generation biofuels (i.e. current
targets), which otherwise would deter or lock out second-
generation biofuels. To avoid a lock-in, the government should
promise future support exclusively to second-generation biofuels.
In sociological terms, UK public authorities disagreed about
whether targets for ﬁrst-generation biofuels would protect a space
for future second-generation biofuels or rather would impede
them.
Such disagreements can be interpreted in relation to different
institutional responsibilities toward promise-requirement cycles.
According to theory, when technological expectations from tech-
nology innovators become increasingly shared, they are held
responsible for their practical fulﬁlment by other actors willing
to give political-ﬁnancial support, e.g. public authorities. Conver-
sely, the latter are held responsible for fulﬁlling their policy-
promises of support. Accordingly, the promise-requirement cycle
would mobilise various resources towards technoscientiﬁc
advance. If technological expectations are disappointed, however,
then technology innovators are blamed for their practical failure,
and public authorities may redirect support (van Lente, 1993,2000;
van Lente and Rip, 1998).
When the UK government and Parliamentary Committees
persistently disagreed over biofuel targets, the disagreements
arose partly from their different reputational stakes towards
promise-requirement cycles. Parliamentary Select Committees
have their reputation dependent on pursuing ultimate policy
goals such as sustainability and holding other public authorities
accountable for doing so (HoC_IO, 2009). Acting as advisors and
monitors of the UK government, these Committees do not need to
promise support to industry. By contrast, the UK government,
as the executive public authority in technology policy, had multi-
ple reputational stakes; towards the EU, the biofuel industry and
Parliament. The government was the public authority directly held
responsible for policy-promises of support, especially toward
technology innovators (as also inferred by Dunlop, 2010: 354).
Through technological expectations for second-generation bio-
fuels, current targets for ﬁrst-generation biofuels served as ‘wish-
ful enactments of a desired future′ (Borup et al., 2006: 286). Along
with greater funding for biofuels R&D, the UK government
presented its targets as necessary to stimulate biofuel innovators
to fulﬁl future EU targets with second-generation biofuels. Beyond
a cognitive basis, such expectations also have a performative role
in deﬁning institutional responsibilities. For the UK government,
such responsibilities entailed a policy dilemma, whose implicit
rationale combines elements that remained separate in previous
analyses of UK biofuel policy.
8. Conclusion: policy-promise lock-ins
Encouraging a transition to preferable emerging technologies
may entail a dilemma for executive public authorities in technol-
ogy policy, namely: Fulﬁlling previous policy-promises of support
is a requirement to maintain credibility towards current and
prospective technology innovators. Otherwise, betraying previous
policy-promises to the incumbent regime could undermine the
effectiveness of future technology policy in mobilising current and
prospective technology innovators on which public authorities
depend. Given such reputational stakes, executive public autho-
rities may delay a complete redirection of support from incumbent
to preferable emerging technologies, presenting such delay as
instrumental for stimulating technoscientiﬁc advancement toward
the latter.
This dilemma can be theorised as a policy-promise lock-in.
In such situations, previous policy-commitments towards technol-
ogy innovators of incumbent technologies – potentially contro-
versial and driven by several imperatives – are ofﬁcially justiﬁed as
necessary for the development of preferable emerging technolo-
gies. When trapped in a policy-promise lock-in, executive public
authorities may endorse technological expectations for emerging
technologies accordingly. In doing so, they aim to protect their
reputation in technology policy, avoid responsibility for any
disappointment about technological development, and promote
technology development per se – the UK government's ofﬁcially
stated aim in biofuel policy.
Given its EU obligations, the UK government's dependence on
ﬁrst-generation biofuel suppliers drove policy-promises to that
industry, thus imposing ‘reputational sunk-costs′ on the DfT
(cf. Dunlop, 2010: 354). Those reputational stakes were linked
to technoscientiﬁc advance through expectations for second-
generation biofuels. For the UK government, those expectations
justiﬁed short-term support for incumbent biofuels, but poten-
tially resulted in a lock-in (van Lente and Rip, 1998: 217).
Executive public authorities can set temporal limits to their
policy-promises. As the biofuel controversy emerged, in 2007 the
EU Council and UK government subjected their 2020 target to a
pre-condition on the future availability of second-generation
biofuels. In sociological terms, they made their policy-promises
conditional upon technology innovators fulﬁlling their own tech-
nological expectations. Conﬂicting with its prior commitments to
the EU and biofuel industry, in 2009 the UK government sought
wider legitimacy by slowing down UK biofuel targets, while
referring to doubts about sustainability in the Gallagher Review.
This preﬁgured the later caution of the European Commission's
2012 proposal.
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Despite omitting any pre-condition for the availability of second-
generation biofuels in the 2009 Directives, the European Commission
eventually proposed in 2012 to cap support for ﬁrst-generation
biofuels at the current 5% level – only half the 10% target for 2020.
Like the UK's target slow-down, the Commission's proposal some-
what accommodated controversy over ﬁrst-generation biofuels'
unsustainable feedstocks, while still ensuring them short-term sup-
port. In such ways, executive public executive authorities sought to
minimise future risks of reputational damage towards publics as well
as technology innovators.
In sum, promise-requirement cycles link the UK government's
reputational sunk-costs towards ﬁrst-generation biofuel suppliers
with future technoscientiﬁc advance in second-generation biofuels.
Such linkage extends insights of previous analyses of UK biofuel
policy. For broader relevance, a ‘policy-promise lock-in’ describes a
policy dilemma about distributing support between incumbent
versus emergent and preferable technological systems, whereby both
need state support. Thus the sociology of expectations – previously
applied to technological expectations from technology innovators –
can be extended to analyse public authorities.
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